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Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of data
sharing among multiple parties, without disclosing
the data between the parties. We focus on sharing of
data among parties involved in a data mining task.
We study how to share private or confidential data in
the following scenario: without disclosing their private
data to each other, multiple parties, each having a
private data set, want to collaboratively construct
support vector machines using a linear, polynomial or
sigmoid kernel function. To tackle this problem, we
develop a secure protocol for multiple parties to conduct
the desired computation. The solution is distributed,
i.e., there is no central, trusted party having access
to all the data. Instead, we define a protocol using
homomorphic encryption techniques to exchange the
data while keeping it private. We analyze the protocol
in the context of mistakes and malicious attacks, and
show its robustness against such attacks. All the parties
are treated symmetrically: they all participate in the
encryption and in the computation involved in learning
support vector machines.
Keywords: Privacy, security, support vector machine,
secure multi-party computation.

I. Introduction
In this paper, we address the following problem: multiple parties are cooperating on a data-rich task. Each
of the parties owns data pertinent to the aspect of the
task addressed by this party. More specifically, the data
consists of instances, each party owns her instances but
all parties have the same attributes. The overall performance, or even solvability, of this task depends on the
ability of performing data mining using all the instances
of all the parties. The parties, however, may be unwilling
to release their instances to other parties, due to privacy
or confidentiality of the data. How can we structure information sharing between the parties so that the data
will be shared for the purpose of data mining, while at
the same time specific instance values will be kept conProceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 5-9, 2005, pp. 477 - 482.

fidential by the parties to whom they belong? This is
the task addressed in this paper. In the privacy-oriented
data mining this task is known as data mining with horizontally partitioned data (also known as homogeneous
collaboration [15].) Examples of such tasks abound in
business, homeland security, coalition building, medical
research, etc.
The following scenarios illustrate situations in which
this type of collaboration is interesting:(i) Multiple competing supermarkets, each having an extra large set of
data records of its customers’ buying behaviors, want to
conduct data mining on their joint data set for mutual
benefit. Since these companies are competitors in the
market, they do not want to disclose their customers’
information to each other, but they know the results obtained from this collaboration could bring them an advantage over other competitors. (ii) Success of homeland
security aiming to counter terrorism depends on combination of strength across different mission areas, effective international collaboration and information sharing
to support coalition in which different organizations and
nations must share some, but not all, information. Information privacy thus becomes extremely important: all
the parties of the collaboration promise to provide their
private data to the collaboration, but neither of them
wants each other or any other party to learn much about
their private data.
Without privacy concerns, all parties can send their
data to a trusted central place to conduct the mining.
However, in situations with privacy concerns, the parties
may not trust anyone. We call this type of problem the
Privacy-preserving Collaborative Data Mining problem.
As stated above, in this paper we are interested in homogeneous collaboration where each party has the same
sets of attributes [15] but has different sets of instances.
Data mining includes a number of different tasks,
such as association rule mining, classification, and clustering, etc. This paper studies how to learn support
vector machines. In the last few years, there has been a
surge of interest in Support Vector Machines(SVM)[29,
28]. SVM is a powerful methodology for solving problems
in nonlinear classification, function estimation and density estimation which has also led to many other recent
developments in kernel based learning methods in gen-
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eral [7, 25, 24]. SVMs have been introduced within the
context of statistical learning theory and structural risk
minimization. As part of the SVM algorithm, one solves
convex optimization problems, typically quadratic programs. It has been empirically shown that SVMs have
good generalization performance on many applications
such as text categorization [13], face detection [20], and
handwritten character recognition [16]. Based on the existing SVM learning technologies, we study the problem
of learning Support Vector Machines on private data.
More precisely, the problem is defined as follows: multiple parties want to build support vector machines on a
data set that consists of private data of all the parties,
but none of the parties is willing to disclose her raw data
to each other or any other parties. We develop a secure
protocol, based on homomorphic cryptography and random perturbation techniques, to tackle the problem. An
important feature of our approach is its distributed character, i.e. there is no single, centralized authority that
all parties need to trust. Instead, the computation is distributed among parties, and its structure and the use of
homomorphic encryption ensures privacy of the data.
The paper is organized as follows: The related work
is discussed in Section 2. We describe the SVMs training
procedure in Section 3. We then present our proposed
secure protocols in Section 4. We give our conclusion in
Section 5.

II. Related Work
II.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation
A Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) problem
deals with computing any function on any input, in a
distributed network where each participant holds one of
the inputs, while ensuring that no more information is
revealed to a participant in the computation than can be
inferred from that participant’s input and output. The
SMC problem literature was introduced by Yao [31]. It
has been proved that for any polynomial function, there
is a secure multi-party computation solution [12]. The
approach used is as follows: the function F to be computed is firstly represented as a combinatorial circuit,
and then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in
the circuit. Every participant gets corresponding shares
of the input wires and the output wires for every gate.
This approach, though appealing in its generality and
simplicity, is highly impractical for large datasets.
II.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
In early work on privacy-preserving data mining, Lindell
and Pinkas [17] propose a solution to privacy-preserving
classification problem using oblivious transfer protocol,
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a powerful tool developed by secure multi-party computation (SMC) research. The techniques based on SMC
for efficiently dealing with large data sets have been addressed in [14], where a solution to the association rule
mining problem for the case of two parties was proposed.
Randomization approaches were firstly proposed by
Agrawal and Srikant in [3] to solve privacy-preserving
data mining problem. In addition to perturbation, aggregation of data values [26] provides another alternative
to mask the actual data values. In [1], authors studied the problem of computing the kth-ranked element.
Dwork and Nissim [9] showed how to learn certain types
of boolean functions from statistical databases in terms
of a measure of probability difference with respect to
probabilistic implication, where data are perturbed with
noise for the release of statistics. In this paper, we focus
on privacy-preserving among the inter-party computation.
Homomorphic encryption [21], which transforms
multiplication of encrypted plaintexts into the encryption of the sum of the plaintexts, has recently been used
in secure multi-party computation. For instance, Freedmen, Nissim and Pinkas [10] applied it for set intersection. For computing set intersection, unlike [10], [2] and
[27] proposed an approach based on commutative encryption. The work most related to ours is [30], where
Wright and Yang applied homomorphic encryption [21]
to the Bayesian networks induction for the case of two
parties. The work that are closely related ours is [32],
where Zhan et.al. present secure protocols for learning
support vector machine over vertically partitioned data.
In this paper, we develop a secure protocol, based on
homomorphic encryption and random perturbation techniques, for multiple parties to build SVMs over horizontally partitioned data without compromising their data
privacy.

III. Learning SVMs On Private Data
Support vector machines were invented by Vapnik [29]
in 1982. The idea consists of mapping the space of input
examples into a high-dimensional feature space, so that
the optimal separating hyperplane built on this space
allow a good generalization capacity. The input examples become linearly or almost linearly separable in the
high dimensional space through selecting an adequate
mapping [28]. Research on SVMs is extensive since it
was invented. However, to our best knowledge, there is
no effort on learning SVMs on private data. In this paper, our goal is to provide a privacy-preserving algorithm
for multi-parties to collaboratively learn SVMs without
compromising their data privacy.

PRIVACY-PRESERVING SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES LEARNING

III.1 Problem
We consider the scenario where multiple parties P1 , P2 ,
· · · , and Pn , each having a private data set (denoted
by D1 , D2 , · · · and Dn respectively), want to collaboratively learn SVMs on the concatenation of their data
sets. Because they are concerned about their data privacy, neither party is willing to disclose its actual data set
to others. Specially, we consider the homogeneous collaboration where each data set contains the same number
of attributes but different set of instances. Let m be the
total number of attributes in each data set. Let N be the
total number of instances, N1 is the number of instances
for P1 , N2 is the number of instances for P2 , · · · , and Nn
is the number of instances for Pn . We further assume
that the class labels are shared but the instance identifiers and actual attribute values are kept confidential.
III.2 Overview of Support Vector Machine
SVM is primarily a two-class classifier for which the optimization criterion is the width of the margin between
the different classes. In the linear form, the formula for
output of a SVM is
→
→
u=−
w ·−
x + b,

(1)

→
→
where −
w is the normal vector to the hyperplane and −
x is
the input vector. To maximize margin, we need minimize
the following [5]:
1 → 2
w || ,
min ||−
w,b 2

(2)

→
→
→
subject to yi (−
w ·−
xi + b) ≥ 1, ∀i, where −
xi is the ith
training example, and yi is the correct output of the
SVM for the ith training example. The value yi is +1
(resp. −1) for the positive (resp. negative) examples in
a class.
Through introducing Lagrangian multipliers, the
above optimization can be converted into a dual
quadratic optimization problem.
1
→
min
Ψ(−
α ) = min
→
−
αi ,αj 2
α

N
X
i,j=1

→
→
αi αj yi yj K(−
xi , −
xj ) −

N
X

αi , (3)

i=1

→
where αi are the Lagrange multipliers, −
α = α1 , α2 , · · · ,
αN , subject to inequality P
constraints: αi ≥ 0, ∀i, and
N
linear equality constraint: i=1 yi αi = 0.
By solving the dual optimization problem, one obtains the coefficients αi , i = 1, · · · , N , from which the
→
normal vector −
w and the threshold b can be derived
[22].
To deal with non-linearly separable data in feature
space, Cortes and Vapnik [6] introduced slack-variables
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to relax the hard-margin constraints. The modification
is:
1 → 2
w || + C
min ||−
2

N
X

ξi

(4)

i=1

→
→
subject to yi (−
w ·−
xi + b) ≥ 1 − ξi , ∀i, where ξi is slack
variable that allows margin failure and constant C >
0 determines the trade-off between the empirical error
and the complexity term. This leads to dual quadratic
problem involving Eq.[ 3] subject to the constraints C ≥
PN
αi ≥ 0, ∀i and i=1 yi αi = 0.
To solve the dual quadratic problem, we apply sequential minimal optimization [22] which is a very efficient algorithm for training SVMs.
III.3 Sequential Minimal Optimization
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) [22] is a simple
algorithm that can efficiently solve the SVM quadratic
optimization (QO) problem. Instead of directly tackle
the QO problem, it decomposes the overall QO problem
into QO sub-problems based on Osunna’s convergence
theorem [20]. At each step, SMO chooses two Lagarange
multipliers to jointly optimize, find the optimal values
for these multipliers, and updates the SVM to reflect the
new optimal values.
In order to solve for the two Lagrange multipliers,
SMO firstly computes the constraints on these multipliers and then solves for the constrained minimum. Normally, the objective function is positive definite, SMO
computes the minimum
along the direction of the linP2
ear constraints
y
α
i=1 i i = 0 within the boundary
C ≥ αi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
α2new = α2 + y2 (E1 − E2 ) η,

(5)

→
→
where Ei = yi αi K(−
xi , −
x ) − yi is the error on the ith
−
→
training example, xi is the stored training vector and
−
→
x is the input vector, and η is the second derivative of
Eq.[3] along the direction of the above linear constraints:
→, −
→
−
→ −
→
−
→ −
→
η = K(−
x
1 x1 ) + K(x2 , x2 ) − 2K(x1 , x2 ).

(6)

Next step, the constrained minimum is found by clipping
the unconstrained minimum to the ends of the line segment: α2new,clipped is equal to H if α2new ≥ H, is equal to
α2new if L < α2new < H, and is equal to α2new,clipped = L
if α2new ≤ L. If the target y1 is not equal to the target y2 ,
L = max(0, α2 −α1 ), H = min(C, C+α2 −α1 ). If the target y1 is equal to the target y2 , L = max(0, α2 + α1 − C),
H = min(C, α2 + α1 ).
The value of α1 is computed from the new, clipped,
α2 :
α1new = α1 + s(α2 − α2new,clipped ),

(7)
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where s = y1 y2 .
In the procedure of sequential minimal optimization,
the only step accessing the actual attribute values is the
computation of the kernel function K. Kernel functions
have various forms. Three types of kernel functions are
→
considered: they are the linear kernel function K = (−
a·
−
→
−
→
→
b ), the polynomial kernel function K = ((−
a · b ) + θ)d ,
where d ∈ N, θ ∈ R are constants, and the sigmoid kernel
−
→
→
function K = tanh((κ(−
a · b )) + θ), where κ, θ ∈ R are
−
→
→
constants, for instances −
a and b .
To compute these types of kernel functions, one needs
to compute the inner product between two instances. If
the two instances belong to the same party, this party
can compute the inner product by herself; if one instance
→) belongs to one party (e.g., P ), and the other in(e.g., −
x
1
1
→) belongs to another party (e.g., P ), then
stance (e.g., −
x
2
2
→·−
→
−
→ −
→
P1 can compute (−
x
1 x1 ) and P2 can compute (x2 · x2 ).
−
→
−
→
However, to compute (x1 · x2 ), different parties have to
collaborate. How to conduct this inner product computation across parties without compromising each party’s
data privacy presents a great challenge. In next section,
secure protocols are developed to tackle this challenge.

→ = {x ,
Protocol 1 INPUT: P1 ’s input is a vector −
x
1
11
−
→
x12 , · · · , x1m }, and P2 ’s input is a vector x2 = {x21 , x22 ,
· · · , x2m }. The elements in the input vectors are taken
from the real number domain.
1. P1 performs the following operations:
(a) She computes e(x1i +ri )s (i ∈ [1, m]) and sends
them to P2 . ri , known only by P1 , is a random
number in real domain.

IV. Protocols
IV.1 Introducing Homomorphic Encryption
The concept of homomorphic encryption was originally
proposed in [23]. Since then, many such systems have
been proposed [4, 18, 19, 21]. We observe that some
homomorphic encryption schemes, such as [8], are not
robust against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we
base our secure protocols on [21], which is semantically
secure [11].
In our secure protocols, we use additive homomorphism offered by [21]. In particular, we utilize the following characterizer of the homomorphic encryption functions: e(a1 )×e(a2 ) = e(a1 +a2 ) where e is an encryption
function; a1 and a2 are the data to be encrypted. Because of the property of associativity, e(a1 + a2 + .. + an )
can be computed as e(a1 ) × e(a2 ) × · · · × e(an ) where
e(ai ) 6= 0. That is
d(e(a1 + a2 + · · · + an )) = d(e(a1 ) × e(a2 ) × · · · × e(an )) (8)

d(e(a1 )a2 ) = d(e(a1 a2 ))

→, −
→
compute the K(−
x
1 x2 ), the key issue is how P1 and P2
→ and −
→ without
compute the inner product between −
x
x
1
2
disclosing them to each other. In our secure protocol, P1
adds a random number to each of her actual data values, encrypts the masked values, and sends the encrypted
masked terms to P2 . By adding the random numbers, P2
is prevented from guessing P1 ’s actual values based on
encryption patterns. Firstly, one of parties is randomly
chosen as a key generator. For simplicity, let’s assume
P1 is selected as the key generator. P1 generates a cryptographic key pair (d, e) of a semantically-secure homomorphic encryption scheme and publishes its public key
e. P1 applies the encryption key to each element of x1
→·−
→
(e.g., e(x1i + ri )). P2 computes e(−
x
1 x2 ). He then sends
−
→
−
→
→·−
→
e(x1 · x2 ) to P1 who decrypts it and gets (−
x
1 x2 ).
We describe this more formally as

(b) She computes e(−ri )s (i ∈ [1, m]) and sends
them to P2 .
2. P2 performs the following operations:
(a) He computes t1 = e(x11 + r1 )x21 = e(x11 · x21 +
r1 x21 ), t2 = e(x12 +r2 )x22 = e(x12 ·x22 +r2 x22 ),
· · · , tm = e(x1m )x2m = e(x1m · x2m + rm x2m ).
(b) He computes t1 ×t2 ×· · ·×tm = e(x11 ·x21 +x12 ·
x22 +· · ·+x1m ·x
2m +r1 x21 +r2 x22 +· · ·+rm x2m )
→·−
→ + Pm r x ).
= e(−
x
x
1
2
i=1 i 2i
(c) He computes e(−ri )x2i = e(−ri x2i ) for i ∈
[1, m].
→ · −
→ + Pm r x ) ×
(d) He computes e(−
x
x
1
2
i=1 i 2i
e(−r1 x21 ) × e(−r2 x22 ) × · · · × e(−rm x2m ) =
→·−
→
e(−
x
1 x2 ).
We need to show that the above protocol is correct,
and that it preserves the privacy of P1 and P2 as postulated in Sec. 3.1.

(9)

IV.2 A Secure Protocol

Lemma 1 (Correctness). Protocol 1 correctly computes
→·−
→
the inner product (−
x
1 x2 ) against semi-honest parties.

→ and P
Let’s assume that P1 has an instance vector −
x
1
2
−
→
has an instance vector x2 . Both vectors have m elements.
→, and
We use x1i to denote the ith element in vector −
x
1
−
→
x2i to denote the ith element in vector x2 . In order to

Proof When P2 receives eachP
encrypted element e(x1i +
m
x2i
ri ) and e(−ri ), he computes i=1 e(xP
which,
1i + ri )
m
according
to
Eq.(9),
is
equal
to
e(
x
·
x2i +
1i
i=1
Pm
−
→·−
→+
r
x
)
for
all
i
∈
[1,
m].
He
then
computes
e(
x
x
i
2i
1
2
i=1
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Pm

i=1 ri x2i )×e(−r1 x21 )×e(−r2 x22 )×· · ·×e(−rm x2m ) =
→
−
→
e(−
x
1 · x2 ) according to Eq.(8). After that, he sends it to
→·−
→
−
→ −
→
P1 who computes d(e(−
x
1 x2 )) = (x1 · x2 ). Therefore,
−
→
−
→
(x1 · x2 ) is correctly computed.

Lemma 2 (Privacy-Preserving). Assuming the parties
follow the protocol, the private data are securely protected.
Proof There are 2 points we need analyze. (1) Whether
P1 can obtain P2 ’s private data. There is no information
that P2 sends to P1 , thus, P2 ’s private data cannot be
disclosed to P1 . (2) Whether P2 can obtain P1 ’s private
data. What P2 receives from P1 is encrypted and masked
element of P1 ’s data. Since P2 has no decryption key
and doesn’t know the random number used by P1 , it is
impossible that P2 can obtain P1 ’s private data.
Lemma 3 (Efficiency). Protocol 1 is efficient from both
computation and communication point of view.
Proof To prove the efficiency, we need conduct complexity analysis of the protocol. The bit-wise communication cost of this protocol is (2m + 1)α where α is
the number of bits for each transmitted element. The
following contributes to the computational cost: (1) 2m
encryptions; (2) 2m exponentiations; (2) 2m-1 multiplications. Therefore, the protocol is sufficient fast.

V. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the problem of collaboratively
learning Support Vector Machines on private data. We
develop a secure collaborative protocol based on semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme. In our
protocol, the parties do not need to send all their data
to a central, trusted party. Instead, we use the homomorphic encryption and random perturbation techniques
to conduct the computations across the parties without
compromising their data privacy. As future work, we will
develop secure protocols for the cases where more kernel
functions are applied. We will also apply our technique
to other data mining computations, such as secure collaborative clustering.
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In Claire Nédellec and Céline Rouveirol, editors, Proceedings of ECML-98, 10th European Conference on Machine Learning, number 1398, pages 137–142, Chemnitz,
DE, 1998. Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, DE.
[14] J.Vaidya and C.W.Clifton. Privacy preserving association rule mining in vertically partitioned data. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, July
23-26, 2002, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
[15] M. Kantarcioglu and C. Clifton. Privacy preserving data
mining of association rules on horizontally partitioned
data. In Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos,
CA.

[1] G. Aggarwal, N. Mishra, and B. Pinkas. Secure computation of the k th-ranked element. In EUROCRYPT pp
40-55, 2004.

[16] Y. LeCun, L. Botou, L. Jackel, H. Drucker, C. Cortes,
J. Denker, I. Guyon, U. Muller, E. Sackinger, P. Simard,
and V. Vapnik. Learning algorithms for classification: A
comparison on handwritten digit recognition, 1995.

[2] R. Agrawal, A. Evfimievski, , and R. Srikant. Information sharing across private databases. In Proceedings of
ACM SIGMOD ICMD, pp 86-97, 2003.

[17] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. Privacy preserving data mining. In Advances in Cryptology - Crypto2000, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, volume 1880, 2000.

482

[18] D. Naccache and J. Stern. A new public key cryptosystem based on higher residues. In Proceedings of the
5th ACM conference on Computer and Communication
Security, pp. 59-66, San Francisco, California, United
States, 1998.
[19] T. Okamoto and S. Uchiyama. A new public-key cryptosystem as secure as factoring. In Eurocrypt’98, LNCS
1403, pp.308-318, 1998.
[20] Freund-R. Girosi F. Osuna, E. Training support vector machines: An application to face detection. In Proceedings of Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
130-136.
[21] P. Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite
degree residuosity classes. In Advances in Cryptography EUROCRYPT ’99, pp 223-238, Prague, Czech Republic,
May 1999.
[22] J. Platt. Sequetial minimal optimization: A fast algorithm for training support vector machines. In Technical
Report MST-TR-98-14. Microsoft Research, 1998.
[23] R. Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. Dertouzos. On data
banks and privacy homomorphisms. In Foundations of
Secure Computation, eds. R. A. DeMillo et al., Academic Press, pp. 169-179., 1978.
[24] Mller K.-R. Schlkopf B., Smola A. J. Nonlinear component analysis as a kernel eigenvalue problem. In Neural
Computation, 10, 1299-1319.
[25] Smola A. (Eds.) Schlkopf B., Burges C. Advances in
kernel methods - support vector learning. In MIT Press.
[26] L. Sweeney. k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy. In International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness
and Knowledge-based Systems 10 (5), pp 557–570, 2002.
[27] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton. Secure set intersection cardinality with application to association rule mining. In
Journal of Computer Security, IOS Press, to appear.
[28] V. Vapnik. The nature of statistical learning theory. In
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1995.
[29] V. N. Vapnik. Estimation of dependences based on empirical data. In Springer-Verlag, New York, 1982. 22.
[30] R. Wright and Z. Yang. Privacy-preserving bayesian
network structure computation on distributed heterogeneous data. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining (KDD), 2004.
[31] A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1982.
[32] Z. Zhan, S. Matwin, and L. Chang. Building support
vector machines on private data. In International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, to appear, 2005.

JUSTIN ZHAN, LIWU CHANG, STAN MATWIN

